Without the trust that tAssets should be pegged to oracle prices, tAsset prices could theoretically diverge from oracle prices. Unlike minting liquidation which can create buying pressure to drive prices upwards, the NEPRI TFA protocol can only drive downward pressure to the minimum collateral price of an tAsset. For instance, if the MCR of an asset is 120% and the oracle price of XXX is $200, then the price of an mXXX could, in theory, reach $240. However, once the price of tXXX is greater than $240, then arbitrageurs can simply mint tXXX with $240 worth of collateral, sell the tXXX for $260, and forego the collateral. Therefore, the theoretical maximum price of tXXX would be $200. If, in practice, tAsset prices did drift significantly higher than oracle prices, governance could be used to solve this by creating incentives to mint and sell assets. For instance, the MCR could be lowered in order to reign in tAsset prices or negative selling fees could be used to incentivize users to mint assets and sell them in the market. Changing governance, however, would require a proposal and the collective agreement of NEPT stakers.